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Abstract 
In recent years, debates about energy justice have become increasingly prominent. 
However, the question of what is at stake in claims about energy justice or injustice is a 
complex one. Signifying more than simply the fair distribution of quantities of energy, 
energy justice also implies issues of procedural justice (participation) and recognition 
(acknowledgement of diverse values constitutive of ways of life). It is argued that this 
requires an acknowledgement of why energy use matters in everyday life. 
 
Data from the Energy Biographies project at Cardiff University is used to explore 
connections between the relational texture of everyday life and the ethical significance 
of energy. In particular, it is demonstrated that embodiment, attachment and narrative 
are features of sense-making that contribute significantly to everyday understandings of 
the ethical meanings of different ways of using energy. Using multimodal and 
biographical qualitative social science allows these implicit forms of evaluation to 
become more tangible, along with the relationships between them. Conceiving of energy 
consumers as subjects with biographies, with attachments, and as engaged bodily in 
energy consumption can open up, it is suggested, different ways of enacting the 
procedural and recognition aspects of energy justice.  
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Interviewer: And did you look at efficiency standards and things like that? 
Lucy: Yeah, Ǯcos Iǯve chosen all my appliances so I think everything, I think there was – 
what appliance would it have been?  The tumble dryer I think, that literally hardly ever 
got above a B.  But most of my things are like AAA or AA […] 
 
In everyday life, energy matters – or so much research would suggest – chiefly as a 
costly resource to which many in developed as well as developing countries have 
inadequate access. Policy on energy consumption in developed countries has focused in 
recent years on the issue of fuel poverty, while in developing nations the issue of energy 
poverty has increasingly featured on development agendas (Bouzarovski and Petrova 
2015). In response to these issues, discussions have arisen around the multifaceted 
concept of energy justice in this journal and elsewhere. The ethics and politics of access 
to energy services has thus entered the foreground of scholarly attention. What we 
might call the everyday ethics of energy is, however, also about negotiating an 
increasingly tangled thicket of norms and imperatives. This is particularly the case in 
contexts where responsibility is delegated to individuals for following norms of energy use that reflect the need, in response to the Ǯenergy trilemmaǯ, to reduce energy use not 
only because of its costs but on climate change grounds also. 
 
Such discourses of energy transition are increasingly interwoven with debates about 
energy justice. Moving from a fossil fuel-based to a low-carbon energy system raises 
multiple questions about energy and equity (Newell and Mulvaney 2013). In this article, 
we explore how a particular qualitative sociological approach to what we define as the 
everyday ethics of energy can help understand how these questions are connected with Ǯthickerǯ meanings of energy consumption. In particular, we examine some of the 
complex ways in which energy consumption is experienced as contributing to lives felt 
to be good lives, lives worth living. 
 
To explore this theme, we focus on a qualitative approach to understanding the place of 
energy consumption in everyday life which is both biographical and multimodal. It 
examines how the significance of energy consumption is bound up with personal 
lifecourse transitions, both experienced and anticipated. Lucy, who moved from London 
to a rural village in South Wales with her husband and young family for a better quality 
of life, identifies in the extract above how she has developed expertise in choosing the 
most energy-efficient appliances possible, mainly on grounds of cost, but also because avoiding Ǯwasteǯ seems, environmentally speaking, the right thing to do. Having given up 
her highly-paid consultancy job to look after her children, she prides herself on managing the householdǯs energy use efficiently and responsibly. Yet at the same time, 
her descriptions of the house she is renovating with her husband manifest conflicting 
imperatives, later in the same interview.  
[…] we are getting a log fire and how actually theyǯre probably super inefficient arenǯt 
they in heating a room? […] weǯve put massive radiators in our new house cos its really 
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Victorian, tall ceilings, and so we just donǯt need a wood burner to be on at any point but 
actually itǯll sort of make the room  […].  
 
Here, it seems that Lucy has simply gone from talking about how much she cares about 
energy efficiency to saying things that make her earlier claim look like bad faith. So should we read Lucyǯs apparently conflicting statements as evidence for how affluent 
lifestyles simply promote individual interests and preferences over the common good, 
whether the scale encompassed by this good is that of the family or the global 
community? In this article, we suggest that there is more to the ethics of everyday 
energy use than a clash between what might be called the non-ethical importance of 
energy (energy services which provide for preferences) and imperatives that might be 
taken to represent some aspect of an ethics of energy (e.g. oriented towards waste 
avoidance, or environmental sustainability). 
  
Energy matters, we argue, as part of what Michael Lambek (2010) has called Ǯordinary ethicsǯ. For Lambek, the ethical register is immanent within everyday life, an evaluative Ǯshould beǯ that is implicit within everyday attitudes, emotions, statements and above all 
actions. The defining contribution of this register is the making of distinctions between 
suffering and flourishing, between lives well-lived according to determinate criteria and 
ones that are comparatively diminished (Sayer 2012, pp. 8-9). At times, it becomes 
explicit, particularly where there are conflicts, tensions or interruptions to the flow of 
what is normatively agreed upon (cf. Zigon 2007). In this sense, it is of anthropological 
interest insofar as the ethical register is a key part of how subjects make sense of the 
world, both collectively and individually. This aspect of sense-making perspectives 
places tends to place subjects in evaluative and sometimes in critical dialogue with 
shared ways of seeing. What, analytically speaking, makes the ethical attitude distinct 
from an expression of mere preference, is the implication that what is being said or 
done is an attempt to give voice or expression to that which is right or good in general. 
In other words, that what is at issue is interpreted as something which is universally to 
be avoided or desired, whereas preferences are simply preferred. The key difference 
between the objects of ethical evaluations and mere preferences is that the rightness or 
goodness of ethical objects is open to argument and justification, whereas a stated 
preference takes an assertion of subjective will to be the final word. Ethical evaluation, 
whether implicit or explicit, holds open a space of reasons for desiring or avoiding 
something on the basis of its rightness or goodness.   
 
Lucyǯs statements about her commitments to energy efficiency, on the one hand, and to 
a particular style of rural living, on the other, could be seen as Ǯmere preferencesǯ. But 
what this misses about her statements is the way in which they help to articulate 
particular ethical evaluations of ways of life. Energy efficiency is not simply practically 
better, it is about not being wasteful, about aligning oneǯs behaviour with a compelling 
imperative. Reinstating wood fires is an aesthetic choice, but it is also part of achieving a 
valued way of life, in which what is good for Lucy, her husband, her children (and as, we 
shall see later, her friends) are bound up together. Lucyǯs evaluations of what matters 
and of how she should act are connected to particular ways of using energy. They 
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emerge from a backcloth of shared ideas about good lives and moral actions. Yet these 
ideas not just norms that determine both consciousness and behaviour. They are 
material ingredients of evaluations around which flow strong emotional and affective 
currents. These evaluative judgements therefore take on great importance for her sense 
of who she is and what she can and should do. They are affirmed through action as well 
as belief, embodied in consumer goods and modes of conduct as well as discussed and 
justified. Energy consumption is not simply an instrumental means to an end (obtaining 
heat, light, enabling cooking, etc.). It can also be a constitutive (Groves 2011) ingredient 
of valued ways of being in the world, of identities, and forms of agency. 
 
It is this everyday ethics of energy, the ways in which energy is felt to matter ethically as 
part of the background and sometimes the foreground of everyday life, is the subject of 
this article. Using qualitative data from Energy Biographies, we show how the use of 
energy services is inseparable from the everyday as an Ǯongoing flow of continual concrete evaluationǯ (Sayer 2012, p. 97). This demonstrates how the nuances and 
subtleties of everyday practice and talk about practice can reveal ethical tensions and 
conflicts that may have great significance for energy policy, particularly in relation to 
envisaged energy transitions.  
 
We contend that the everyday ethics of energy can supply a thicker perspective on what 
matters that is highly significant when we consider ethical and political aspects of the 
envisaged energy transition that go beyond distributive justice. We argue here that 
everyday energy ethics can help deepen our understanding of the procedural and 
recognition (Schlosberg 2013) aspects of energy justice. It can do this by opening up 
questions over the viability and desirability of different forms of energy transition, and 
also about the new norms and imperatives that may be associated with them. What is 
more, the evolving entanglements of practices, technologies and identities explored by 
our biographical approach are evidence that participatory initiatives can face 
difficulties, as everyday energy use is often emotionally-charged. 
 
 
Energy Biographies methodology 
Much research on energy justice draws on quantitative data relating to access to energy 
services or energy poverty (Bouzarovski and Petrova 2015; Sovacool and Dworkin 
2013). The role of qualitative methods in understanding ethical concerns about energy 
is less established. While ethnographic studies of how people use and make sense of 
energy are an established part of scholarship, particularly in relation to emerging 
energy transitions (Strengers 2011; Ozaki and Shaw 2014), tying such work into 
explicitly ethical debates comes up against a reluctance from qualitative social scientists 
to take steps into a territory typically claimed by philosophers (Sayer 2009). It has been 
proposed, however (Sayer 2011, 246–52), that qualitative sociological or 
anthropological research can help us enrich ideas articulated as thin concepts within 
ethics and political philosophy (good lives, suffering, respect and disrespect, dignity and 
indignity). In this way, qualitative social science can help subjects to articulate what 
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matters to them, and to create opportunities for social actors (including the research 
subjects themselves) to respond to these interpretations as informed agents.  
 
Funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), Energy Biographies 
was designed to examine how policies intended to drive reductions in energy demand at 
home and at work can face difficulties arising from the complexities of mundane energy 
use. In particular we wanted to explore the ways in which lifecourse transitions alter 
energy use, and how understanding these can help any transition to a low-carbon 
energy system. We undertook a programme of qualitative longitudinal and also 
multimodal research designed to make mundane energy use and its supporting socio-
technical infrastructures tangible and visible (Shove 1997), and to explore how people 
make sense of energy in their  everyday lives. Typically, in studies of the moral meaning 
of consumption (ethical consumption etc.), specific consumer products and the ways in 
which they matter are studied (Hall, 2011). But here our focus was not solely on objects 
that happen to consume energy, but on how practices that consume energy do or not 
themselves become objects of concern. The longitudinal approach served as a way of 
tracking lifecourse transitions which brought with them changes in how energy is used. 
Using participant photography tasks and future-focused films about domestic energy, a 
multimodal approach allowed participants to explore ways of making sense of their 
daily lives based on a variety of sensory modes (Pink, 2003; Pink & Leder Mackley, 
2012). These multimodal elements formed foci for discussion in later interviews. In this 
way, how to make energy visible, tangible and sensible was a research question that 
was pursued in distinct yet interlinked ways.  
 
People were interviewed over the course of 18 months between 2011 and 2013, across 
four case sites.  These included the Royal Free Hospital (RFH) in North-London, with 
interviewees recruited from among the hospitalǯs employees. Two areas in Cardiff were 
included: Ely and Caerau; a socially-deprived inner-city ward, and Peterston-Super-Ely; an affluent commuter village on the cityǯs outskirts. Finally, we also recruited 
participants from the Lammas/Tir-y-Gafel ecovillage in Pembrokeshire. Residents there 
live off-grid, have built homes from sustainable materials, and have land-based 
livelihoods (see also Fordeǯs article in this issueȌ. First round interviews were carried 
out with a total of 74 individuals (pseudonymised below) who were participating in 
energy-use reduction initiatives of various kinds.  A sub-sample of 36 participants was 
then selected to take part in two subsequent rounds of interviews and multimodal 
activities, and supplied with smartphones with which they were asked to photograph 
aspects of their everyday energy use before the second and third interviews.   
 
In the following sections, we explore themes drawn from the projectǯs data which illustrate three ways in which Lambekǯs immanent ordinary ethics is entangled with 
energy use, before going on to discuss in more depth how these themes illuminate the 
objects of everyday energy ethics, and particularly how they exemplify the ways in 
which energy use is connected with ideas of the good life. These three themes are: 
embodied engagement with technologies, attachment and identity, and narratives of 
transition. Although framing energy justice against a backdrop of energy or fuel poverty 
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offers an important route forward, understanding the ethics of everyday energy use 
enables us to understand how mundane energy practices are themselves already 
implicitly ways of participating in debate over what matters (Michael 2015), as they 
give subjects a stake in particular ways of life, help to shape identities, and prime 




We now return to Lucy. When she was first interviewed, she was living in the first of 
two houses in Peterston she lived in during the interview period. This followed, as 
noted previously, a move from London to South Wales, where both she and her husband 
had family roots. Desiring a better quality of life for her children went along with the 
need to secure for herself an identity focused on being primary caregiver (having given 
up a well-paid consultancy job) and also as a home renovator in this new rural location.  
Part of this identity is, as noted above, her evaluation of herself as an efficient household 
manager, which she avows humorously (yet not without frustration) in contrast with her husbandǯs practices Ǯit does make me cross when like Sean especially just is 
deliberately almost, you know, wasting [energy]ǯ.  
  
At the same time, the wood fires that she and her husband were reinstating in their 
second house in Peterston, into which they moved during the period of our study, 
represent another set of values (and as we discuss below, another identity). These other 
values are also embodied by a patio heater, of which Lucy took a photograph before our 
second interview with her. Just as she saw the wood fires as inefficient, yet as playing an 
essential role in producing a desired mode of rural life, she affirmed that the patio 
heater was wasteful, yet served a similar purpose. The wastefulness associated with Ǯheating the outdoorsǯ (Hitchings, 2007) is undeniable: 
[…] we do love our patio heater when itǯs a sunny evening but it gets a bit cold and dark 
and you can sit out and theyǯre like probably the worst things arenǯt they?  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
Figure ͳ: Lucy’s patio heater 
 
Yet the importance of the heater, and the practices reliant upon it, lie in how they 
support her sense of what it means to be a Ǯgood hostessǯ. 
Cos we love being outside, we just love that you can you know go, we were sitting out 
there one evening … it was like midnight and you could have a drink outside still and itǯs 
so lovely here cos itǯs so quiet and everything so but you wouldnǯt have been able to do it 
without that so or you would have been freezing. So thatǯs our kind of, we know itǯs really 
bad but weǯre still going to use it. 
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 ǮEveryoneǯ ȋin her part of PeterstonȌ has Ǯtwo carsǯ and Ǯwoodburnersǯ, and so the 
wastefulness of the wood fires can at least be underplayed in relation to these norms of 
consumption. However, the patio heater sticks out as wasteful even by these standards. 
Its meaning, however, and that of the practice of heating the outdoors, are related to the 
role of hostess. Following the move to Wales, Lucy and her husband make extra efforts 
to sustain old friendships. She strives to make her home as welcoming, as warm, as 
homely as possible so that its rurality can be enjoyed. This may be partially about 
displaying social status, and in particular the status displayed in a decision to leave 
London behind for the country. Yet at the same time, the fires and the patio heater 
embody a continuing desire to care for friends – and for friendships. The rural house is 
not just a home, but a place for regularly hosting friends, a convivial space whose 
material fabric (warm) and meaning (welcoming) are anchored (in part) by the Ǯbadǯ 
heater. We will return to Lucy in the next section. 
 
Ronald, another affluent Peterston resident, described his attachment to his two wood-
burning stoves, and reflected on the importance of expanding off-shore wind power and 
developing large scale tidal power. At the same time, he talked eloquently of his deep 
and long-term emotional attachment (he was in his seventies at the time of speaking to 
him) to driving – and indeed a particular kind of driving. He felt that his identity was 
bound up with specific cars, material objects that bear the traces of ongoing care, and 
symbolise particular competences and shared meanings. At the core of his relationship 
with driving is a kind of autonomy connected with the experience of controlled risk, and 
a sense of comradeship that revolves around building, modifying and driving cars. 
What turns me on is a piece of old kit that youǯve put together and youǯve developed and, 
you know, the cars I have are not just reconstructed but Iǯve developed them as you would 
have developed them from original. They are not an original but they do stuff that they 
couldnǯt do when they were first built. ... Thatǯs the appeal for me; youǯve done this, youǯve 
put it together, you and your chum, its adventure, more than motorsport in a sense … the 
adventure bit is every much as important as the mechanical bit but both are important … 
so I wouldnǯt want to do that in a battery-powered car or a hydrogen car or a modern 
car, wouldnǯt want to do it and it wouldnǯt turn me on. 
 
With a firm appreciation of the importance of climate change and resource depletion, 
Ronald nevertheless sees a renewables-led future through the Ǯlensǯ of his attachments 
to driving. Renewables symbolise loss, a loss of a form of abundance and with it a threat 
to his identity and to shared participation in this kind of identity, which represents a 
cultural resource for living a particular kind of good life: Ǯ) feel it will be a loss for 
certainly my generation and probably for the generation behind me. I think it will be a lossǯ. Driving is, for him, a practice associated with a set of personal, biographically-
conditioned values, relating to risk-related autonomy, competences, ideals and forms of 
friendship.  
 
In Ely, Jack echoed Lucy in describing how a recent lifecourse transition from 
employment to self-employment had been accompanied by a change in identity, one 
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embodied in his consumption decisions and particularly in how he had remodelled his 
home. These decisions had been, in part, about creating a particular kind of domestic 
ambience suited to entertaining friends (Thomas et al., forthcoming). Buying particular 
objects, for Jack, was about creating an ideal of sensory comfort, which he described in 
reference to, for example, the clocks and standby lights on the electronic devices in his living room: Ǯat night time itǯs like the Starship Enterprise, everything has got a little light on it but ) quite like itǯ. Extremely conscious of energy efficiency and the value of 
low-carbon forms of energy, he was nonetheless very attached to both a high level of 
material consumption (consumer electronics, having one vacuum cleaner for each floor 
of his house) and to particular high-energy consumption objects (like a garden hot tub). 
He spoke of how he did not consider any of this wasteful, as he purchased objects that 
he had a clear place for in his new, remodelled home, ones which he knew he would use 
and enjoy. He viscerally contrasted his attachment to his realm of things with his motherǯs attachment to hoarded Ǯuselessǯ objects, suggesting that his conscious 
purchase of objects, and engagement in the practices they made possible, represented 
an attachment to a genuinely efficient style of consumption. 
 
As Wallendouf and Arnould (1988) point out, there can be strong links between what 
goods people consume (and how they consume it) and their self-concepts. The same, 
our data suggest, is also true of how energy is consumed in the form of particular 
services, provided through specific devices and infrastructures. In each of the cases we 
have highlighted here, a relatively affluent individual describes his/her attachments to 
different, and what might be identified as differently wasteful, energy-using practices. 
Yet there is more to these attachments than just how they support particular individual 
identities. )n each case, the attachments people avow are part of a Ǯconvoyǯ of 
attachments (Antonucci and Akiyama 1994), in which emotional connections to other people ȋLucyǯs family and friends, Ronaldǯs fellow enthusiasts, Jackǯs friendsȌ are highly 
significant. Additionally, attachments to ideas and more abstract aesthetic or ethical 
values (like homeliness or avoiding waste) are linked to these other attachments. The 
practices through which concerns about and for these convoys of attachment are looked after can themselves become objects of emotional attachment in turn ȋas with Jackǯs electronics or Lucyǯs patio heaterȌ. In each case, how energy is used (and perhaps 
wasted) is a reflection of who or what is cared about, and how. In each case, how an 
individual evaluates their energy use is bound up with how they evaluate these 
attachments and their significance for their own lives. This is not a simple process. It is 
bound up with expectations about the future through which ambivalence and anticipated loss emerge ȋas with RonaldȌ. )t is connected, in Lucyǯs narrative, with 
tensions between the need to not be wasteful and the need to be a good hostess for old 
friends. And with Jack, it is expressed through an explicit rejection of one set of values 
and associated practices in favour of another, one which moves within an ethical 
register by offering (somewhat convoluted, self-exculpatory and possibly self-
contradictory) reasons why one mode of consumption is less wasteful than another.  
 
In understanding the meaning of practices, sociologists often point to the shared 
meanings associated with them, which help to explain how some practices gain more 
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and more adherents (Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 2012). Lucyǯs wood fires are, for 
example, undoubtedly cultural signifiers of a certain widely-shared aesthetic, which 
interlocks with other ways of embodying homeliness. Yet the meaning of different ways 
of using energy for these interviewees is, in each case, also about the ways in which 
values and practices represent for them (as individuals with particular biographies), 
constitutive ingredients of a life that can be considered a good life, one that could 
generally be seen as rich and worthwhile. Through the biographical lens we have used 
on Energy Biographies, these aspects become tangible and visible. Shove et al (2012, p. 
73) note that practices are engaged in, in part, because they bring Ǯinternal rewardsǯ. By 
this, Shove et al mean the intrinsic satisfaction associated with performing a practice 
well, independently of what instrumentally useful results it might produce. But 
practices bring another kind of internal reward. Lucy does not engage in particular 
heating practices just to ensure her house is warm. Using wood fires and patio heaters 
are part of how she cares for her friends and for her attachments to these friends. 
Because of this relational aspect, they are also part of how she cares for herself. They 
assist in sustaining her own relational sense of who she is, and also support her in 
acting in conformity with what she considers are good normative standards. They are 
woven into a biography that is, in part, an ethical story, a story about what a life that 
wants to be good might look like. 
 
This does, however produce tensions for Lucy, as we have indicated. In the next section, 
we explore these tensions further, and the ethical conflicts to which they lead, both in 
her case and for another interviewee whose circumstances are very different.  
 
Liminal transitions 
Adopting a biographical lens makes it possible to render more tangible the ways energy 
use changes over time. As the data presented in the previous section suggest, however, 
energy-using practices change significantly alongside comparably-significant  shifts in 
identity. And as people work on their identities, they also re-evaluate their perspectives 
on how one should live. As we have seen, everyday energy ethics works with and 
around attachments that are taken to be essential constituents of lives lived well. In this 
section, we explore in more depth how an everyday energy ethics rooted in 
connectedness can produce moral tensions and conflicts that are hard to resolve. These 
tensions do not simply arise between different values (such as between e.g. efficiency 
versus homeliness), but can best be understood as arising between different styles, or 
better, logics of evaluation.  
 
Lifecourse transitions, like those described by Lucy and Jack, can be characterised as Ǯliminalǯ (Turner, 1974), insofar as they involve passing beyond the boundaries of one 
socially-recognised identity (e.g. being single) into a new one (e.g. being married). They 
may, in some cases involve the ritual breaking and reformation of attachments, and 
formal induction into new practices. More generally, anthropologists have shown how, 
within a variety of tribal and so-called pre-modern societies liminal transitions are often 
resolved through concerted and collective efforts at integrating individuals into new 
roles and thus new identities (such as when adolescent boys in some societies leave 
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family homes to become hunters). These efforts make use of shared cultural resources 
(such as rituals and narratives of transition) as well as the forming of new attachments 
to people, objects, places, institutions, and/or to new practices associated with post-
reintegration identities. In contemporary industrialised societies, such efforts at 
reintegration after lifecourse transitions are sometimes experienced as difficult, as 
medical sociologists have shown. Certain experiences (like a cancer diagnosis or 
suffering stillbirth) are hard to make sense of with shared cultural narratives, as when 
medical professionals attempt to make patient experiences of this kind fit into a 
narrative of restitution, for example (Frank, 1998; Layne, 1996).   
 
We have already alluded in the previous section to what might be called post-transition Ǯidentity workǯ (Snow and Anderson 1987), focusing on Lucy and Jack, and on how this 
is undertaken in an ethical register, one in which models of a life well-lived are 
employed to make sense of experience. We now focus more explicitly on lifecourse 
transitions as recounted by Lucy, and also by another interviewee, Christine. In these 
cases, identity work raises certain difficulties, which may be manifested within 
interviews as moral conflicts about energy.   
 
As we have already seen, Lucy articulates her long-standing attachment to ideals of wise 
management that antedate her house move by contrasting her own sense of right 
conduct (avoiding waste) with her husbandǯs irresponsibility. Yet their transition, in 
pursuit of better quality of life, to an old (and hard to heat) rural house places her in a 
difficult position. This is a product of the interaction between her attachments and the 
material fabric of her home. Hosting old London friends regularly meant using the 
heating more ȋǮa lot of people come here and complain its coldǯȌ and cooking large 
meals. Add to this increased efforts to keep the house warm for her young children, and 
the result was much higher energy costs. 
I never really wanted to waste money, energy but now I think itǯs just, when I got my last 
energy bill, I couldn't believe it. 
 
Her attraction to the new home, and her identification with the role of rural hostess, 
becomes juxtaposed with her struggle to keep bills low. Striving to render her home 
congruent with her emerging identity is thus a source of tension. As noted in the 
previous section, Lucy justifies the use of wood fires within a normative frame that is distinct from that of avoiding waste. Within an affluent community where Ǯeverybodyǯ 
has a wood burner and two cars, she feels her inefficient wood fires still reflect forms of 
waste that, as part of a comfortable rural lifestyle, can be justified. In other words, this is a Ǯgoodǯ form of waste, at least within a communitarian Ǯgood lifeǯ normative framework. 
However, there is no such context in which she feels the patio heater can generally be 
located and redeemed, however. It remains a bad object, embodying a bad form of 
waste. At this point in her narrative, she acknowledges the troubling nature of heating 
the outdoors, however. She draws attention to the way in which it cuts against both a 
more general imperative to avoid waste and also against the standards of her 
community. But then she immediately disavows this negative meaning of the practice. 
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At the point where a conflict between her attachment to a new ideal of Ǯthe good lifeǯ 
and her identification as a wise resource manager comes into sharpest relief, she says of 
the heater Ǯwe know itǯs bad, but weǯre still gonna use itǯ. 
 
Lucy thus gives voice to a conflict which, as she becomes increasingly aware of it while 
reflecting on the photographs she took between the first and second interviews, 
appears to be something she wants to gloss over. It is the result of a clash between 
distinct identities and the attachments that support them, a clash that is ultimately one 
between the logics of evaluation that are anchored around these identities and 
attachments. On the one hand, there is the imperative to avoid waste, which 
distinguishes between good and bad behaviour; on the other, the desire for a good life, 
which distinguishes between better and worse ways of being (in which hospitality, 
rurality and friendship loom large). 
 Lucyǯs move from the city to country and the resulting tension between different 
energy-using practices and attachments is situationally specific. It is one that arises 
both because of her familyǯs affluence (and the latitude for action and choice it brings) 
and the material attributes of her home. Christine (like Jack, a resident of Ely), inhabits a 
very different set of circumstances. Christine was in her early fifties, and lived with her 
husband and youngest child (her other children having now left home) in a large house, 
to which the family had moved several years earlier, owing to the need to find a larger property to accommodate one of their childrenǯs disabilities. They had recently put their 
house up for sale, given that most of their children had left. Before the first interview, 
Christine had recently become unemployed. During the course of the interviews, the 
death of her father-in-law, who had recently come to live with the family, occurred. 
 
The multiple lifecourse transitions Christine described in her interviews had brought a 
variety of changes in how the family consumed energy. She recounted how, over the 
course of her life, she had moved house several times (and renovated several new 
properties either with previous partners or with her husband) as family circumstances 
have changed. These changes had included events like splitting up with a former 
partner before re-marrying, and most recently, bringing her father-in-law into the 
family home. Having him live with them meant keeping the house warmer, at a more 
constant temperature, which increased energy bills. Nonetheless, she represented all 
these transitions as temporary disruptions and identified with an image of herself as 
flexible, adaptive and capable. Speaking of the 1980s, she said noted that ǮI had the two 
eldest children and a low income. You just got by. It sounds really strange and it does sound very nostalgic saying, ǲWell you just got by.ǳǯ  Avoiding waste as part of managing 
complex family commitments was vital and reducing energy use was, she said, part of 
this. 
 
Yet if Ǯgetting byǯ seemed to evoke a past identity and role, it remained very much the 
cornerstone of her identity in the present. Each time a significant transition had 
occurred, she recounted how her care for home and for children had been re-established. Unlike Lucyǯs experiment with a new identity in a new home, Christineǯs 
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interviews focused on continuity. This continuity was, however, characterised as 
cyclical – rather than as a progressive search for a better way of living a life. Christineǯs 
transitions were about renovating houses after moving, saying goodbye to children who 
had left home, welcoming them back after university terms or relationship break-ups, 
taking in aged parents, gaining and losing employment.  
Some are subtle changes that you don't realise until you think about 'oh okay!' our way of 
living is always like this. Like I said, right at the very beginning, kids leave, kids come back 
whether it's University or whether they move in with their friends or whether they move 
in with a partner, whether that relationship suffers and they come back, they always 
come back to mum.  
 
Reworking, recycling, re-using was part of settling after each such transition, including 
sorting out clothes ȋǮ)ǯve always got charity bags in my cupboardǯȌ, heating systems ȋǮthatǯs my gas fire that )ǯve got rid ofǯȌ and home extensions. In each case, the far side of 
a transition was seen as the re-establishing of a dynamic balance between the family 
and its social environment, achieved partly through changing how the family used 
energy. Increased costs as family members moved in or returned home were balanced 
by careful attention to thermostats, additional energy efficiency measures, or by nagging children to keep turning things off. While Christineǯs sense of how she should 
live was focused on trying to integrate a desire to avoid waste with the need to care 
effectively, she talked, as her interviews went on, of how recent lifecourse changes has 
made this difficult.  
 Christineǯs story is recounted in a form that is somewhat like a spiral. Her narrative of 
herself as carer and builder, and her stories of her activities of caring and building/re-
building, identify her both as subject to the vicissitudes of an interdependent and 
vulnerable existence, but also as actively and resiliently responding to uncertainty. 
Nonetheless, while there is continuity here, there is also disruption, arising from events ȋchildrenǯs relationship breakups, her father in lawǯs death, losing her jobȌ that erupt 
amidst everyday life: ǮOh God, I literally, you just don't know what's around the corner […] so we don't look into the future as such.ǯ 
 
After the death of her father-in-law, Christine and her husband had begun to redecorate the house again, perhaps hastily: Ǯthe first thing that I think of is just changing your environment.ǯ This decision was linked to several others relating to a plan to sell the 
house that turned out to have a temporary destabilising effect on the household. Ǯ[N]everǯ ȋChristine saidȌ Ǯmake a decision when youǯve just had bereavement.ǯ 
 
As a builder and re-builder, Christine was well-informed about a range of energy-saving 
measures. Yet care for others is always threatening the financial balance between 
incomings and outgoings. Where Lucyǯs care for others, and her linked sense of herself, 
is focused on creating a new way of living well, Christineǯs care for others focuses on Ǯkeeping afloatǯ, reflecting financial circumstances but also emergent events. Her 
adaptability is double-edged. It means continually rebuilding and rebalancing, tinkering 
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with financial and energy budgets. Yet, as her remarks about the future show, it may 
also mean adapting oneǯs perspective, focusing on a relatively narrow sphere of 
concerns, which may make it difficult to plan for thoroughgoing and durable changes in 
how energy is used, or indeed, in other areas of life: Ǯyou just don't know what's around 
the cornerǯ.  
 
Lucy actively disavows the significance of the moral conflict she experiences between 
avoiding waste and living a life well-lived. Christine, on the other hand, avoids talking 
too much about the tension she experiences between a desire to avoid waste and a 
desire to care for her dependents. Within the context of her own life and her familyǯs 
lives, each woman experiences the social imperative to avoid waste, to use energy more 
efficiently, as problematic. In each case, lifecourse transitions bring this imperative into 
friction with other ethical perspectives and valued identities, which help Lucy and 
Christine to articulate identities (the good rural hostess, the carer and rebuilder) that 
they feel are part of good lives. 
 
Attachments emerge, in the interview data presented here, as the material of everyday 
ethics, along with the energy using practices connected to them. Yet as we have seen, 
they are also the source of tension and moral conflicts. What is more, as attachments 
and the identities they support bear significant emotional investments, talking about 
these conflicts can be difficult. We find within our data evidence of how everyday 
energy ethics concerns valued attachments and practices, but some of these support 
identities that may not necessarily be in harmony with other identities that are related 






Embodied engagement with technologies 
So far, we have shown how attention to everyday energy ethics can help us understand 
how implicit ethical frameworks enable our interviewees to make sense of their energy-
using practices. In addition, we have shown how such frameworks can, in relation to 
social imperatives regarding how one should use energy, create tensions and conflicts 
that may be difficult to resolve. As well as pointing to such conflicts, however, our data 
point to more positive implications of everyday energy ethics. In particular, they 
suggest how the attachments which ground everyday energy ethics can open up 
opportunities for changing energy-using practices.  
 
In the introduction, we mentioned how the ways in which energy is used can be seen as part of what Sayer calls the Ǯongoing concrete flow of evaluationǯ. We have seen in the 
foregoing sections how particular ways of using energy are bound up with attachments 
and identities, and also with visions of lives well-lived. In this section, we extend this Ǯthickeningǯ by examining how bodily engagement with energy-using devices and 
infrastructures can also be considered an aspect of this concrete flow of evaluation. We 
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show that biographical and multimodal social science approaches help to make the 
ethical aspects of bodily arrangements, attitudes and activities available for reflection. 
We argue that this approach can therefore provide a basis for critical consideration of 
visions of energy transition. 
  
Devices, appliances and infrastructures are not simply arms-length tools that help to 
achieve pre-arranged ends. They change the ways in which people experience the world 
and transform their capacities for action (Verbeek, 2011). In this way, technologies 
cannot be treated simply as objects ready for use. They are also products and extensions 
of human subjectivity. Their contribution here is not just to modulate pre-arranged 
ends, either, by enhancing our capabilities. In use, particular technologies can also 
reshape what subjects take to be their ends (Mol, 2008). The introduction of new 
technologies can thus help to change implicit evaluations of what is right or good, in 
ways which have significant implications for how (and how much) energy is consumed 
by particular practices.  
 
For example, consider the value attached to convenience in contemporary technological 
societies. During recent decades, a desire for greater efficiency and ease in how 
domestic services are provided has shifted to become an end-in-itself (Shove, 2003). 
Part of this development has led to human agency being designed out of a wide range of 
socio-technical systems (including but not limited to domestic life) as much as possible, 
often through automation. Socio-technical arrangements have therefore emerged that Ǯobviate the human sources of frictionǯ (Ellul 1964: 414) within them. These Ǯhuman sources of frictionǯ are the ways in which human agency can subvert the intended mode 
of operation of technologies. A key design goal must therefore be frictionlessness, often 
achieved by reducing engagement in the system to the making of simple choices 
between predetermined options. Agency – and responsibility (Laidlaw 2010) – thus 
proliferates, thanks to the growing number of devices that operate along these lines. 
The unintended consequences of the central role accorded to convenience as a design 
ideal and as part of an implicit vision of what it is to live a good life, are significant, 
however. The onerous domestic toil which previous generations experienced as part of 
daily washing, cleaning and so on is replaced with other activities. But there are 
complex knock-on effects for how energy is used across the totality of domestic life and 
also for how people manage their time (Shove and Southerton 2000).  
 
There are also other knock-on effects for how people make sense of their environments, 
as energy using practices shift and change alongside technological evolution. If 
attachments can be treated as part of the fabric of everyday ethics, and of everyday 
energy ethics in particular, then the role of the body in attachment also has to be considered as a strand in this fabric. The concept of Ǯbodily reasoningǯ has been used in 
relation to childhood attachment (Miller-McLemore, 1994, pp. 147-148) to articulate 
how bodily comportment and contact shapes emotional attachments. In environmental 
social science, the relationships between bodies and surrounding environments 
(particularly when these environments are disrupted, polluted or otherwise harmed) 
have been depicted as playing a constitutive role within ethical reasoning: Ǯthe somatic 
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 precedes and then is entangled with the rationalǯ (Shapiro, 2015, p. 375). As part of our 
approach to making the implicit, intangible elements of everyday energy use explicit 
and tangible, we used (in addition to the aforementioned photography tasks) viewings 
of short films ȋincluding one of the Monsanto Ǯhouse of the futureǯ from ͳͻͷ͹, and the ʹͲͳʹ UK Channel Ͷ [ChͶ] series Ǯ(ome of the FutureǯȌǯ in our third round interviews. 
These facilitated talk about how it felt to engage bodily in different kinds of energy-
using practices and to imagine futures in which different practices – and thus different 
ways of being in domestic environments – existed (Groves et al. 2016).  
 
This facilitated discussion on the connections between aesthetic qualities associated 
with energy-intensive domestic environments and ethical views relating to lives well-
lived. Many people, from a variety of socio-economic circumstances, valued 
convenience, but also had mixed feelings about it. On the one hand, those who could 
remember (for example) the advent of gas central heating saw it as a liberation from 
shovelling coal as well as heralding a suddenly warm and therefore much more 
comfortable domestic environment: Ǯ)tǯs the best thing in the world that happened to me, was going from coal that we had over in (ywel Dda thereǯ ȋJeffrey, ElyȌ. On the 
other hand, convenience (as a kind of end in itself) was associated with problematic attitudes of carelessness: ǮWe donǯt think about it twice ) mean putting the microwave on or the kettle on or the cooker on is not, you donǯt kind of hmmm do ) really need to do this?ǯ ȋMonica, RF(Ȍ. In this way, the biographical focus of our research links up with 
wider processes of meso- and macro level change which open up a space in which a 
range of different evaluative perspectives can be articulated.  
 
For example, ambivalence became more negatively charged among some participants as they reflected on their viewing of the Ǯfuture homeǯ films. Jonathan ȋPeterstonȌ noted, after watching the CͶ film, that the Ǯsmartǯ technologies and visions of a hyperconnected 
internet of things depicted in it made him reflect that   
Even if all the electricity was coming from renewable, Green sources I think it would still 
bug me a little bit because itǯs the heedlessness of it and the lack of mindfulness and the 
[...] just that, that kind of carelessness of it all.  
 Part of this Ǯheedlessnessǯ, Dennis (RFH) suggested, was that energy-intensive 
convenience tended to strip away intelligent engagement with everyday challenges: 
Like the fridge that re-orders […] I still think it sort of dumbs us down as a kind of society 
and replaces our you know ingenuity and our thinking, free thinking with controlled you 
know thinking and computerisation of everything  
  
Other energy using practices which encouraged less automated or Ǯthinǯ (Casey, 2001) 
forms of engagement with the world were seen differently. While these involved effort – 
and sometimes onerous effort – interviewees contrasted them favourably with 
frictionless convenience. Several people – again, from very different socio-economic 
circumstances – contrasted the experience of building a log fire with central heating, for 
17 
 
example. For example, Sarah (RFH), living in rented accommodation with her daughter 
in North London and Robert, living in a large house with his family in Peterston both 
make such distinctions.  
I think we were saying about the log fire, its rewarding when you sit back and see the log 
fire whereas if you just flick a switch and itǯs there itǯs not as rewarding so who knows you 
know on how it affects our happiness in the long run things like that, donǯt know. (Sarah, 
RFH) 
Yeah well thatǯs, my partner says Iǯm obsessed with it because Iǯm always off up the woods 
looking for wood and things like that, ǮIǯm going to light it tonightǯ, Ǯoh no youǯre not are 
you?ǯ  I mean itǯs only that big.  But it is, itǯs quite nice sitting in front of a fire watching 
telly and my daughter plays in there with her Lego and things when we sit there and itǯs 
quite nice (Robert, Peterston).  
It might be thought that such forms of engagement might simply be viewed as 
inconvenient, as unsuitable for inclusion in a good style of living within a technological 
society. Yet some interviewees, including Sarah and Robert, also spoke of such practices 
that require what might be labelled Ǯfrictiveǯ engagement as the source of different 
forms of convenience alongside more intimate forms of controllability, with very 
different energy-use implications (Vannini and Taggart 2014). This was most evident at 
Lammas, where several respondents described how their reliance on community 
hydropower and household solar photovoltaics tended to create relationships with 
technologies that are more bodily and emotionally engaged (see also Forde, this issue).  
[…]weǯre just so used to checking the readouts we kind of know now and it makes a 
massive difference whether itǯs sunny or not so we know that if its sunny Harry can play 
his music full blast and you know itǯs not a problem he can play his music all day and into 
the evening and if itǯs been gloomy like today for three or four days we know that weǯll 
probably need to check before turning on the computer for a film you know, or whether 
we watch a film on Fayeǯs little small laptop or whether we use Harryǯs big LCD screen [...] 
(Peter, Lammas)  
 Echoing Sarah and Robertǯs remarks, Lammas residents contrast wood-fired heating 
(using wood from the communal woodland) with central heating.  
Yeah but I donǯt like [her motherǯs central heating]. I look back and I think actually I see 
for me how I had no connection with it, no connection you know, whereas when the 
woodǯs there and you see the fire going you think maybe Iǯll just turn the fire down cos the 
pile of wood is shrinking. Yeah I think itǯs very easy if you have no connection with it and 
the bills just go out by direct debit and thereǯs no connection with the fuel that is actually 
being burned to produce this heat (Emmanuelle, Lammas)  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Figure ʹ: Emmanuelle’s woodburner 
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These frictive forms of engagement are thicker, involving more attentive (Stiegler, 
2010) and focal (Borgmann, 1993) ways of being in the world. They derive from Ǯhapticǯ rather than Ǯopticalǯ engagement with things, a form of engagement of a Ǯmindful body at work with materials […] ǲsewing itself inǳ to the textures of the worldǯ (Ingold 2011: 
133). As such, they can be said to represent implicit evaluations of energy using 
practices that locate them within a particular vision of a life well-lived. When 
interviewees were invited to reflect on the modes of life depicted in the two future films, 
those who valued frictive forms of engagement (such as Jonathan, Sarah, Robert, Peter, 
Emmanuelle and Vanessa) tended to judge these imagined alternatives unfavourably. It 
would be a mistake, we suggest, to see such judgements purely as expressions of firmly 
and more or less explicitly-held values. Instead, they reflect more implicit evaluations 
encapsulated within somatic and emotional modes of experience. Nor do these 
judgements evaluate objects or practices simply on the basis of individual inclinations 
or preferences. Instead they are part of an everyday energy ethics. They point to 
heedlessness or controllability as examples of what are seen as ethically significant 
qualities embodied by people and/or objects. Here, we hear peopleǯs bodies and the 
technologies they use becoming Ǯthings to think withǯ that create situations of Ǯopen enquiryǯ in which what matters and what the good life is about are open to 
experimentation and reflection (Hobson 2006: 318).  As different ways of using energy 
enter the foreground of concern explicitly through reflection on the films, the kinds of 
implicit ethical commitments to ways of life and their connected justifications that are 
sewn into the texture of everyday life become open for debate and criticism. In our 
interviews, we hear subjects beginning to worry at the stitches.  
 
Discussion 
In identifying some of the ways in which people make sense of their everyday energy 
use as entering a specifically ethical register, we are not making a normative judgement 
about the rightness or wrongness of the claims we have argued are embedded within 
their engagement in and reflections on mundane practice. Rather, we are connecting 
our study of energy-using practices to the concept of ethical life established by Lambek 
(2010) and his contributors as central to an anthropology of everyday ethics, in which 
evaluations of how the world should be – and of how those subjects who inhabit it 
should act – appear as immanent in social practices (and, as we have suggested, in 
modes of individual somatic and emotional engagement in these practices). In doing 
this, we want to suggest that practices and reflections upon their meanings are more 
than just the revelation of subjective preferences. We can understand them, as we 
maintained in the Introduction, via an analytical distinction between the brute force of 
preference and the persuasive force of the ethical register of discourse. These practices 
express attachments and commitments to ways of life that judge these ways of life to be 
normatively compelling in some way. Over time, we have argued, these modes of 
evaluation become stitched together, sewn into the textures of the world (Ingold 2011: 
133) so that the socio-material environment reflects an Ǯongoing concrete flow of evaluationǯ ȋSayerȌ, and with it, a virtual imaginary of what it is to live a good life, one 




Through the use of biographical, multimodal methods, we have argued, energy using 
practices, the devices and infrastructures that are their material components, and the 
visions of lives well-lived through which people make sense of them can become 
explicit, tangible and visible. As we have seen, such an approach shows that everyday 
imaginaries of lives well-lived are not like idealised philosophical systems, totalising, 
airless and all-encompassing. They are instead multiple and overlapping, exhibiting 
ragged edges that can be clearly seen in Christine, Ronald and Lucyǯs narratives, in 
which each expresses, from a different socio-economic position, more than one 
identifiable ethical imaginary. The ragged edges of these imaginaries stand out when, as 
we discussed under the second of our analytical themes, lifecourse transitions bring 
distinct normative visions and the self-concepts associated with them into tension and 
even conflict.  
 )n Lucyǯs case, tensions emerged between her view of herself as a wise household 
manager, centred on waste as a moral category and her desire to be a good hostess. This 
tension stands out most clearly when her desire to remodel a cold house as a warm 
home takes her beyond what she understands to be the normative limits of the affluent 
rural community she and her family have recently joined, which are symbolised by 
multiple car ownership and wood-burning stoves. The resulting conflict between 
contrasting self concepts is one she acknowledges then immediately disavows when 
talking about her valued patio heaters.      
 
Living in a community where between 19 and 23% of households (Gordon and Fahmy 
2008, 24) have been defined as being in fuel poverty,1 Christineǯs situation is very 
different. Yet at the same time, the ordinary ethics of energy woven through her 
narrative is also expressed in the form of normative tension and identity conflict. Like 
Lucy, she too is concerned with energy efficiency and waste as a moral category and has 
a linked sense of how parental (and filial) responsibility relates to managing energy use. 
These commitments come into tension, however, as cycles of care (for children and 
elderly relatives) expose the household to financial uncertainty, in conjunction with other lifecourse transitions ȋlike unexpected unemploymentȌ. Christineǯs strong views 
on responsibility for waste on the one hand, and responsibility for dependents on the 
other, open up a zone of ethical difficulty which makes it hard to anticipate what might 
happen in the future. While Christineǯs household is not itself in fuel poverty, it is easy 
to imagine that the kinds of ethical tensions manifest in her interviews are likely to 
accompany experiences of fuel poverty, and indeed to be exacerbated by it.  
 
In these cases, and also in those of Ronald, Jack and the others we have discussed above, 
the meaning of mundane uses of energy emerges through the connections it sustains - 
to people, but also things, to practices, and above all to valued ways of living and being. 
The tensions and conflicts we have been exploring in the cases of Lucy, Ronald and 
                                                        
1 The current definition of fuel poverty accepted by the UK Government is that a household is fuel poor if 
it has necessary fuel costs that are above the national median level, and if it spending this amount would 
leave the household with a residual income below 60% of UK median household income for their 
household type. See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fuel-poverty-statistics. 
20 
 
Christine emerge from the relationships between the distinct attachments that they are 
concerned with, and are sharpened by the logics of evaluation they use to articulate 
their importance. These attachments and logics eventually emerge, in our interviews, as 
explicit commitments. Where this happens, practices, values and objects become Ǯthings to think withǯ, or matters of concern (Latour 2004). )n some cases, such as Ronaldǯs and Jackǯs, thinking with things in this way maps out definite reflective moral positions – on 
the one hand, recognising the inescapability of loss; on the other, articulating an 
idiosyncratic vision of a life well-lived. )n others, like Christineǯs and Lucyǯs, thinking 
with things becomes emotionally difficult as identities become compromised. Everyday 
energy ethics is a matter of implicit, but important, attachments that can, in some 
circumstances, become explicit – yet perhaps fragile – commitments.  
 
In the examples above, the importance of energy consumption is articulated by our 
participants in two forms. On the one hand, different ways of consuming energy are 
necessary – instrumentally speaking – for taking care of certain attachments. Keeping her father in lawǯs room warm enough imposes additional costs on Christineǯs 
household (which might be considered wasteful from a certain point of view), yet it is a 
vital part of what it is to take good care of him. At the same time, this instrumental use 
of energy is constitutively necessary, for as an ingredient of good care, it is central to Christineǯs sense of herself as responsible and committed to doing the right thing. The 
interdependence of people, practices, appliances and infrastructures thus takes on a 
dual aspect – in which energy services are seen as both instrumental and as constitutive 
goods, and thus as necessary for good lives in two ways. This constitutive role of energy 
services in relation to valued identities is emphasised in Lucy, Ronald and Jackǯs 
narratives. Here, the meaning of particular ways of using energy is explored through 
consideration of how identity and agency are interdependent with how particular ȋLucyǯs patio heatersȌ and even singular objects ȋRonaldǯs carsȌ are instrumentally 
useful. Objects here mediate and help sustain valued relationships (with Lucyǯs London 
friends, or Ronaldǯs fellow car enthusiastsȌ during lifecourse transitions and beyond. As 
such, the meaning of energy use is not simply reducible to its instrumental value. 
Certain ways of using energy support particular identities over time, and make them 
sustainable and manageable through times of change, uncertainty and even crisis.  
 
If the everyday ethics of energy tends to circle around the value of connection (and 
therefore on ways of thinking about harm and flourishing that have to do with 
connection and, by extension, disconnection), it is often also articulated in narrative 
form (Gilligan 1982). Everyday ethical thinking around energy use thus often focuses on 
how events happen. It also focuses on the significance of when they happen, and in what 
order ȋOǯNeill ʹͲͲͺȌ. Talking about how lives have changed, and how these changes are 
connected with shifts in how energy is used, opens up perspectives on how harm and 
flourishing have been experienced as dimensions of these lives, taking us into a 
specifically ethical register, and one which is not simply about material deprivation.  
 
Relational identity and agency as loci for both harm and flourishing are encountered in 
the interviews with Christine, Jack, Lucy, and Ronald. If identity and agency are 
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interdependent with attachments, then they are also interdependent with the means 
and instruments through which concern and care for attachments are expressed. 
Among these means are devices and appliances, together with the energy consumed by 
them. While these objects and the energy they use are thus instrumental goods, the fact 
that their meaning is bound up with care and concern can also make them constitutive. 
Indeed, they can ȋas in the case of Jackǯs electronics or Lucyǯs wood firesȌ become 
objects of attachment in themselves, which help to further anchor background 
imaginaries of a good life in concrete contexts of activity and consumption.  
 
If we accept that an everyday ethics of energy can be understood in the way sketched 
out in this section, then this has implications for how we approach questions of energy 
justice. This is not because of the immediate implications of an everyday ethics of 
energy for debates about how access to energy services is distributed. Distributive 
justice is often tackled as an issue to be solved through better administration of 
resources – or, in the case of energy justice viewed against the backdrop of energy 
transition – through the management of change (Shove and Walker 2007). At this high 
level, distributive justice often becomes a matter of simplification (Norton 2005), 
reducing the fulfilment of needs to the provision of quantitative units of particular 
goods (of food calories, megawatts of energy, or even more abstract units like utility). This is exemplified by, for example, Vaclav Smilǯs argument that creating an energy 
system that generates 60-110 gigajoules (GJ) of energy annually per capita is enough to 
sustain an optimal level of well-being, before the marginal benefits begin to diminish. 
 
The problem here is that there is no universal user of these goods (Ozaki and Shaw 
2014). Some users may have greater need of energy, others less. The concept of equity, 
rather than equal shares, is thus an important part of energy justice discourse. We may 
attempt to define a set of essential human interests that then would then provide an 
anchor for doctrines of rights (Doyal & Gough, 1991). This would make it possible to 
determine what different sets and subsets of people need (the elderly or chronically ill 
may need more energy for heating or cooling, for example). Some needs may be taken as Ǯprepotentǯ, that is, as needs which must be fulfilled to allow people to pursue their 
broader interests (food, education, shelter, for example). Energy consumption may play 
a significant role in meeting these prepotent needs (a role which may differ in different 
times and places, given variations in available technology). This point leads us towards 
a particular paradigm of distributive justice (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015, p. 440). 
According to this paradigm, access to various forms of energy consumption is 
understood as needing to be equitable across a population and indeed globally. But in 
order to be genuinely equitable, definitions of what forms of energy consumption are 
genuinely needed have to be responsive to how people themselves understand the 
difference between necessary and non-necessary uses of energy. The picture of what 
justice involves thus becomes more complex. Rather than just affirming that some 
energy services are Ǯnecessary for all humansǯ in the same form, then we require Ǯsome evidence of shared social understandingsǯ (Walker, Simcock, and Day 2016) of how 
energy is used in a society. Such evidence would enable us to track what socially 
necessary uses of energy might be. Such uses would be ones that are seen as enabling 
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 people to participate Ǯin the lifestyles, customs and activities that define membership of societyǯ (Bouzarovski and Petrova 2015, 33). 
 
With the question of what uses of energy count as socially necessary, we move away 
from the simplified and indeed highly administrative or managerial model of quantified 
needs. Consultation, participation and engagement become necessary. Are smartphones 
socially necessary? Access to television and internet? Tumble dryers or electric heaters? 
Here, distributive justice is bracketed momentarily. Instead, the question of what kinds 
of energy access need to equitably distributed within and between nations moves into 
the foreground (Bouzarovski and Petrova 2015). Issues of procedural and recognition 
justice (Schlosberg 2013) – who gets a say and how what they say is allowed to make a 
difference – come into focus. 
 
But what makes the issue even more complex is that to understand social necessity, we 
need to go beyond the idea of prepotent needs. Answering the question of social 
necessity in the context of focus groups like those examined by Walker, Simcock and 
Day invites participants to use their own experience to answer questions about needs 
and deprivation generally to determine what energy services are necessary for people 
to then fulfil particular other needs (Sovacool and Dworkin 3, 440). Social necessity is 
thus conceived in a similar way to the necessity Nussbaum attaches to capabilities 
(Nussbaum 2003). Here, humans are defined as requiring certain opportunities in order 
that they can be said to be capable of living a well-lived life. The issue here, however, is 
that not all these capabilities can easily be separated from each other, analytically 
speaking. For example, Nussbaum defines affiliation – including emotional attachment 
to other humans – as a central capability alongside others. But as we have seen, 
attachment is, in everyday energy ethics, inescapably part of how a wide range of needs 
are met with the aid of energy services. Shelter, as an element of Nussbaumǯs bodily 
health capability, is met through home (biographical attachment to a particular 
dwelling), which for Lucy, is connected to friendship, ideals of hospitality, and her sense 
of identity. This thicker context through which the meaning of need is understood by 
our participants only becomes apparent when the analytical lens falls on individual 
biographies, and the significance of particular events (such as lifecourse transitions) 
that happen in a specific order, creating impacts which endure.  
 
Snapshots of socially-necessary uses of energy provide a particular picture of what 
might help to fulfil needs in general. However, they do not allow us to trace particular 
ways in which the use of energy, over time, can enrich lives by contributing to the 
formation of attachments, and the cultivation of valued identities and ways of living that 
they can support. Nor do they allow us to understand the ways in which life events, 
relating to socio-economic conditions, family relationships and other factors can 
interact with patterns of energy use to create uncertainty and vulnerability that go 
beyond a lack of material security. Christine, Jack, Lucy and Ronald all have very 
different stories to tell about flourishing and ill-being, security and disruption. But each 
of these interviewees tell them in ways that strive to place energy use within the context 




The everyday energy ethics we have traced within talk about mundane practices and 
domestic devices demonstrates how the ways in which energy matters to people are 
highly significant in complex and often invisible ways for whether lives are seen as 
going well or badly. They thus open up an alternative point of view on energy 
transitions and energy justice, This perspective invites us to re-evaluate our 
assumptions about how people, as ethical subjects, should be recognised as capable of 
contributing to decision making processes that concern the future of how energy is 
produced and used.  
 
Conclusion 
Everyday energy ethics, we have argued (following Lambek and others) is a mostly 
implicit register through which people make sense of their experiences of using energy. 
In everyday energy ethics, ethical evaluation is immanent in practices, in attachments, 
and in corporeal engagement in both. In line with the descriptive anthropology of ethics, 
we have explored above multiple ways in which energy use comes to matter, as a 
constitutive element of valued identities and ways of being in the world. We have 
argued that a thick analysis of the meanings of energy use can point towards a re-
evaluation of some procedural and recognition aspects of energy justice approaches. 
Wider participation in thinking about socially necessary, but also broadly desirable and 
undesirable ways of using energy, must necessarily be part of a low carbon energy 
transition, for reasons that might be called instrumental, but also substantive and 
normative (Fiorino 1990). But to frame participation chiefly as a matter of determining 
how access to different ways of using energy should be distributed, even where 
methods have been developed to counter unhelpful simplification of needs, risks 
missing out on important ways in which energy use can contribute both to flourishing 
and to harm. These may be hard to trace without elicitation methods that are sensitised 
both to past biographical transitions and anticipated futures. Energy Biographies 
suggests that calling on citizens to think about socially necessary energy use may have 
an important role. At the same time, this role should be complemented by research that 
enables wider reflection on how and why particular patterns of energy use have become 
necessary for individuals, families and communities. In addition, such research might 
make it possible to imagine different ways of using energy. A biographical approach can 
explore links, as we have argued, between broader social transitions and biographical 
attachments (as in the widespread adoption in the UK of gas-fired central heating and 
the responses to it, both positive and ambivalent, we have detailed in this article). Using 
such an approach can perhaps support attempts to encourage public deliberation on 
sustainability agendas while also looking at was to transform energy consumption in 
ways that enrich attachments and identities – not only in communities in the global 
North but indeed globally.  
   
Everyday energy ethics in this sense does not lead directly to an evaluation of the 
ethical content of Lucy, Jack or anyone elseǯs evaluations of their own or othersǯ energy 
use. What it does do is increase sensitivity to the complexity of these evaluations as they 
evolve over time. The limitations of our methods here lie principally in the ways in 
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which they have, as part of Energy Biographies, outlined the directions we have 
described above, as well as in the ways in which it was often not possible to interview 
more than one person from a particular household, so as to gain distinct and potentially 
conflicting perspectives on the meanings of energy use patterns. Our methods have not 
yet been developed in ways that allow the sometimes difficult moral conflicts 
articulated by our respondents to be explored further. These issues may raise ethical 
questions for researchers, just as they pose particular difficulties for participatory 
approaches that might want to focus on the moral conflicts that may arise from within 
everyday energy ethics and their significance for energy transition policies. 
 
With energy transitions policy in the frame, we suggest that the significance of the 
research outlined in this paper points in another direction, which has to do with the 
framing and reframing of transitions as such. Reflexivity towards the framing of social 
problems has long been on the agenda within science and technology studies (Chilvers 
and Kearnes 2015). Visions of transition may have a positive effect on agency (Shove 
and Walker 2007), but they also selectively interpret social priorities in ways that may 
exclude those of relatively marginalised groups. The energy trilemma itself represents 
an issue framing that positions affordability, security and decarbonisation in ways that, 
first and foremost, favour the priorities of energy producers. As Hildyard et 
al. (2012) point out, the meaning of energy security changes radically when its meaning 
is sought in dialogue with urban as opposed to rural communities, and in the global 
South as contrasted to the North. As Marchant (2016) points out, when potential 
consumer-side obstacles to energy transition are of concern, often the focus falls on how 
to change behaviour. But the issues which transition raises often touch not on how to 
incentivise change in consumer behaviour, but evaluative and normative issues, ones related to values like Ǯaesthetics, convenience and trustǯ (Marchant 2016, 1). As we have 
argued here, these issues go deeper, relating to how energy using practices and 
infrastructures relate to valued identities and ways of being. It may be, then, that 
attention to the everyday ethics of energy opens up the possibility of a participatory re-
definition of the energy trilemma, one which reflects end-user priorities (as suggested 
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